Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent five-day visit to France, Serbia, and Hungary occurred amidst heightened tensions with many European countries, driven by disputes over trade, concerns about support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and allegations of Chinese espionage activities.
Xi’s trip followed closely on the heels of two high-profile U.S. diplomatic missions to China in April, led by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. Despite expressions of mutual interest in stabilizing relations, there were no clear indications that the significant policy gaps between them could be effectively bridged.
While the ceremonial aspects of Xi Jinping’s reception followed a familiar pattern, the geopolitical and economic landscape, as well as the objectives of his recent European visit, diverged significantly from those of his last trip to the continent in 2019. This time, the emphasis was on exploiting Western divisions and easing trade tensions with the European Union (EU) — tasks that have become progressively more challenging.
The Ceremonial and the Contextual
The official reason for Xi’s visit was to mark the 60th anniversary of China’s relations with France on the first stop of his trip and the 75th anniversary of official ties with Hungary on his last stop. Chinese state media played up the trip as Xi’s celebration of friendly relations and cooperation with European nations. Lin Jian, a spokesman for China’s foreign ministry,saidXi’s visit would “inject stability into the development of China-Europe relations and make new contributions to peace and stability in the world.”
Upon arriving in Paris, Xi lauded relations between China and France, proclaiming that the two sides “have established a model for the international community of peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation between countries with different social systems.” Coinciding with his arrival, Xi published an op-ed in the French newspaperLe Figaro, making his case for cooperation over confrontation and stressing the importance of Sino-French relations as a “bridge of communication between East and West.”
Yet, it is important not to be misled by these formalities and positive sentiments about cooperation. The context here is key: China’s economy isfacing headwinds, and the United States isimposing restrictionson Chinese firms. Seen through this lens, Xi’s underlying motive for the trip was to counter European efforts to “de-risk” from China and to fend off the threat of a looming trade war with the EU. However, advancing these objectives will prove difficult because this is a different Transatlantic partnership and a different Europe than Xi encountered during his visit to Europe five years ago.
A Different Transatlantic Alliance
The convergence of pandemic-related supply chain disruptions and Beijing’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighted the economic security implications of China’s growing influence. This has brought the perspectives and approaches of the United States and Europe towards China closer together. These events have further solidified the recognition among policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic that economic security and national security are inherently intertwined.
Undoubtedly, the complex economic and political relationships that EU member states have with China have hindered efforts to forge a cohesive and unified Transatlantic policy stance toward China. Differing threat perceptions and economic dependencies among EU members reflect similar disparities between the United States and Europe. Yet, despite these challenges, Transatlantic partners have converged on the recognition that China poses significant challenges and even threats. There is a consensus on the importance of “de-risking,” the desire to uphold security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and the necessity to counter China’s activities on the global stage.
The most significant shifts in China policy across the United States and Europe have primarily centered around economic considerations. A broad consensus has emerged regarding the economic risks associated with China, which include several key concerns:
- Perceived over-reliance on China for critical imports, such as processed rare earth minerals.
- Beijing’s utilization of outbound direct investment and research partnerships to acquire sensitive, often dual-use, technologies.
- The presence of forced labor within certain supply chains, particularly those linked to Xinjiang.
- Longstanding issues related to intellectual property theft and lack of reciprocal market access.
- China’s utilization of economic coercion tactics.
In response to these challenges, governments across Europe and the United States have implemented various defensive measures aimed at mitigating these economic risks posed by China.
A Different Europe
Amidst President Xi’s recent visit to Europe, he was warmly received by French President Emmanuel Macron, while Viktor Orbán of Hungary and Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia orchestrated highly choreographed welcomes. However, European sentiments towards China have generally deteriorated since Xi’s last visit to the continent.
Xi’s first stop on his March 2019 tour of Europe, Rome, included a lavish welcome and ceremonyto celebrate Italy’s decision to participate in his signature Belt and Road infrastructure initiative. While in France, Xi witnessed the signing of multibillion trade deals, including an order or 300 Airbus planes worth 30 billion euros.However, even during this productive and seemingly promising period in Sino-European relations, there were underlying tensions and indications of a more assertive EU strategy towards China.
The EU’s most significant shift in perspective on China occurred on 12 March 2019, just prior to Xi’s visit, when the European Commission and the European External Action Service jointly released a strategic reflection paper. This document introduced the term “systemic rival,” signaling growing frustration within EU circles over Chinas reluctance to open its markets to European companies in vital sectors. The next month, the EU finalized an investment screening mechanism, a pivotal development aimed at establishing a more cohesive, unified EU strategy for detecting and addressing foreign direct investment (FDI) from China in critical assets, technologies, and infrastructure. By this time, concerns over Chinese trade surpluses had also heightened, and Europe’s initial enthusiasm for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had waned.
In the intervening time, the three Baltic stateshave opted out of the China-CEE Cooperation Platform, Beijing’s so-called “17+1” initiative. Poland has scaled back its engagement with Beijing. For the Czech Republic, China is not the attractive partner it once was. Last December, the Italian government formallyannouncedthat it would withdraw from the Belt and Road Initiative.
This trend had, if anything, intensified in the weeks and months leading up to Xi’s recent visit. In January, the EU unveiled a new economic security package. Escalating its crackdown on foreign subsidies, the EU introduced a range of measures to counter what it perceives as unfair state support for Chinese industries. The EU currently has numerous ongoing probes into suspected anti-competitive practices. Additionally, the EU Commission has launched investigations into the activities of social media app TikTok under the Digital Services Act (DSA).
Just prior to Xi’s visit to France, the EU conducted dawn raids on the Warsaw and Rotterdam offices of Nuctech, a Chinese surveillance equipment producer that is partially state-owned, which was blacklisted by the U.S. in 2020 due to security concerns. Several prominent cases of alleged Chinese espionage and influence operations have also surfaced in recent months. In early April, Sweden expelled a Chinese journalist who had resided in the country for two decades, citing national security threats. Shortly after, both Germany and Britain separately charged individuals with spying for the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) to obtain technological information. Additionally, the Dutch military intelligence agency MIVD reported in its annual review that Chinese operatives had targeted Dutch semiconductor, aerospace, and maritime industries in efforts to bolster Beijing’s military capabilities.
These developments illustrate a notable hardening of the European approach towards China. Indeed, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine appeared to solidify a shift towards a more hawkish stance, with the EU and most of its member states reassessing the prudence of engaging with authoritarian regimes. During his visit to Washington last December, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron, once a strong advocate of Chinese investment in UK infrastructure as prime minister, declared that China had become “an epoch-defining challenge.” Indeed, the mood among European leaders regarding China has distinctly changed, as reflected in their vocabulary: “engagement” has become taboo while “de-risking” is now favored.
The shift in attitudes among European decision-makers’ towards China is mirrored by public sentiment. According to survey results released by the Pew Research Center last July, half or more of respondents in North American and European countries expressed somewhat or very unfavorable opinions of China. Similarly, a polllast year of Eastern and Central European countries conducted by Globsec, a research group in Slovakia, found that “negative perceptions of Beijing have soared.”
Modest Investment, Meagre Dividends
Turning back to Xi’s itinerary and assessing what his visit to Europe accomplished or fell short of achieving, it is essential to situate it within the broader framework of the EU’s increasingly assertive stance towards China.
Celebrating 2024 as the 60th anniversary of Sino-French relations, Xi recited familiar talking points about “win-win” economic ties. However, publicly, he made no concessions. Xi dismissed the notion of a Chinese “overcapacity problem.” The absence of significant trade breakthroughs can be traced back to fundamentally divergent perspectives: while the EU sees Chinese practices as anticompetitive, China views EU actions as protectionist.
Similarly, President Macron’s efforts to urge Xi to leverage his influence on Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine were unsuccessful. Xi simply reiterated China’s stance that it will not supply weapons to Russia and would “strictly control” exports of dual-use equipment, positions his government had already committed to enforcing. Xi did not acknowledge Western concerns about China’s role in sustaining the Russian economy by providing access to goods sanctioned by the West. Instead, he accused the U.S. and other Western countries of hypocrisy for exacerbating the conflict through arms deliveries to Ukraine, stating:“We oppose using the Ukraine crisis to cast blame, smear a third country, and incite a new Cold War.”
In contrast to Xi’s visit to France, his trips to EU candidate Serbia and EU member Hungary — two nations led by autocratic leaders considered friendly towards China and close to Russian President Vladimir Putin — were characterized by commitments to strengthen political ties and expand investments. Welcomed by enthusiastic crowds in Belgrade, Presidents Xi and Vučić lauded the “ironclad friendship” between their countries, signing 28 new cooperation agreements and announcing a new deal aimed at enhancing the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Serbia. Xi concluded his Europe trip with a visit to Budapest, where he pledged new investments in transportation and energy infrastructure.
Minding the Gaps
Xi Jinping’s trip to Europe revealed more than it achieved — about the toughening of the European approach to China and its tightening convergence with that of the United States. It also highlighted elements of China’s strategy, which is aimed at exploiting divisions within Europe and driving a wedge between Europe and the United States.
While Xi’s visit did little to widen these gaps, it did expose some of them. The 27 members of the bloc are not in complete alignment. Emmanuel Macron has dedicated much of his international reputation to forging a Europe with “strategic autonomy,” a goal that Beijing has tacitly supported and that, despite its seeming elusiveness, Macron has not abandoned. Another gap is evident between the German position on China, on the one hand, and that of the French and the European Commission (EC), on the other. There is greater readiness in Paris and Brussels to push back against Beijing on the trade front than there is in Berlin.
The pivotal meetings, notably those involving President Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, ultimately yielded dialogues devoid of deliverables. The most significant achievement was Xi’s backing for an “Olympics truce” during the Paris Games. In this regard, the results and prospects resemble recent engagements between U.S. officials and their Chinese counterparts. Ongoing consultations between senior Chinese officials and the Biden White House have fostered more dialogue on critical issues than seen in recent years. However, this does not alter the fundamental tension inherent in U.S.-China relations, though it may lead to the establishment of a new framework for managing economic disputes. Through Xi’s visits to Serbia and Hungary — Beijing’s two remaining friends in Europe — China has retained its economic and geopolitical foothold there. Nevertheless, the prevailing European approach, grounded in the triptych of “China as partner, competitor, and rival”is here to stay, with the “competitor” and “rival” components becoming more prominent.
